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## Would We Gain or Lose by Ending the Truce Talks?

Moderator, MASON GROSS

*S p e a k e r s*

ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS

ALVIN E. O'KONSKI

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—COMING—

—June 17, 1952—


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Affect Our World Position?**

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## Would We Gain or Lose by Ending the Truce Talks?



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### THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

**REP. ALVIN E. O'KONSKI**—Rep. of Wisconsin, member of Veterans' Affairs Committee. Born in 1904, he was raised on a farm near Kewanee, Wisconsin, and graduated from the State Teachers College in Oshkosh in 1927. He has taught in the speech departments of Oregon State College, University of Detroit and Itasca Junior College, for a time published and edited a weekly newspaper, and now owns Radio Station WLIN, Merrill, Wisconsin. O'Konski was elected to the 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st and 82nd sessions of Congress with outstanding majorities. He has consistently championed the rights of smaller nations and fought against Communism through the American Anti-Communist Organization and the Committee to Stop World Communism. He has been a high ranking member of the Veterans' Affairs Committee since 1947.

**REAR ADMIRAL ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, USN (RET.)**—Former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence during World War II; conducted psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese High Command; author of *Behind Closed Doors, the Secret History of the Cold War*. Born in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1890, Admiral Zacharias has completed over 38 years in the United States Naval Service since entering the Naval Academy in 1908. During World War II he commanded the heavy cruiser "Salt Lake City" and led his ship on the famous Tokyo-bound bombing trip to "Shangri-La." After serving for a time as Deputy Director of Intelligence in Washington, he commanded the battleship "New Mexico" and engaged in many operations in the Pacific. Since his retirement from the Navy, Admiral Zacharias has done extensive lecturing, written two books and a number of magazine articles.

**Moderator—DR. MASON GROSS**, Provost of Rutgers University.

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# Would We Gain or Lose by Ending the Truce Talks?

**Moderator Gross:**

Ladies and gentlemen, the problem which we are going to discuss tonight is certainly one of the most baffling problems that has ever faced the American people.

Nearly a year ago, when the United Nations representatives and representatives of their communist opponents in Korea agreed to meet to make arrangements for a truce in the Korean War, I think we all rejoiced that the bloody and bitter struggle might soon be brought to an end. We were not over-optimistic about the progress of the talks, because we were not sure that our opponents were entering into them in good faith, but I think no one envisaged the course that these truce talks would take.

For over eleven months, the talks have dragged on and on, occasionally interrupted and occasionally shifted from one place to another, but apparently getting nowhere. Some of us have suspected that the truce talks themselves are being used by our opponents as a weapon to prolong the war or to prepare for an even more catastrophic war.

We have many of us come to wonder whether we are not playing into the hands of the enemy by permitting these truce talks to continue.

Largely because we seem to be dealing with a new type of political warfare, we are most of us bewildered and do not know how to answer the question as to whether we would gain or lose by continuing with these truce talks any further. Certainly none of us wish to do anything which would plant us unnecessarily into full-scale war. On the other hand, we don't wish to be putty in the hands of

our opponents, as they maneuver for a position in a war which they believe to be inevitable.

To help clarify our thinking along these lines and to present the issues squarely before us, we have tonight two very distinguished and eminently well qualified speakers. The first is Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, retired. Most of us, when we think of Naval Intelligence, think of Captain and later Rear Admiral Zacharias who served as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence during much of the War.

During the same war, Admiral Zacharias also commanded the heavy cruiser "Salt Lake City" and the battleship "New Mexico" and was three times decorated with the Legion of Merit for exceptional meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service. Admiral Zacharias is now a lecturer and a well-known author, one of his books being *Behind Closed Doors, the Secret History of the Cold War*.

Our other speaker is Congressman Alvin E. O'Konski, Representative from the state of Wisconsin. Like so many great Americans, Congressman O'Konski was born on a farm in Wisconsin. It gives me great pleasure to note that earlier in his career he was a college professor and later the editor of a weekly newspaper. He now owns radio station WLIN in Merrill, Wisconsin.

Mr. O'Konski has served in Congress since the 78th Congress and has won all his elections on the Republican ticket with outstanding majorities. He has consistently championed the rights of the smaller nations and has fought



against communism through the American Anti-Communist Organization and the Committee to Stop World Communism. He has been a high ranking member of the Veterans Affairs Committee since 1947.

With these two distinguished men to lead our discussion, we will now take up the question, "Would We Gain or Lose by Ending the Truce Talks?" Admiral Zacharias, would you lead off the discussion?

**Admiral Zacharias:**

Well, Dr. Gross, I want to say emphatically that we would definitely lose by ending the truce talks because time has been on our side and will be on our side for some time to come.

We have been able to build up our depleted defenses, the condition in which we found ourselves when Korea came along. And incidentally, I want to say that that condition was not a responsibility of General Eisenhower as was intimated a few days ago.

We have been able to rebuild our defenses and we must remember the admonition of Mr. C. E. Wilson just before he retired from the Production Authority. He said that we are now over the hump, when any nation will think twice before becoming involved with us in a military way, and a year from now, they'll know that it's suicidal to become involved with us. So that's a clear indication that time is still on our side.

I do want to say this: that we would have made greater progress in these negotiations toward an armistice in Korea if we had only had suitable propaganda. That's one of the deplorable deficiencies that exist today, and I hope that we will be able to do something about that in the near future.

**Dr. Gross:**

Well, thank you, Admiral, for

starting it off. Now Congressman O'Konski, what is your general position respecting continuing the truce talks?

**Congressman O'Konski:**

Dr. Gross, you said in your introduction that this was a baffling problem and it really is, because in answering that very question on the side that I'm taking, I'm in more or less of a quandary, because right now, if you come right down to brass tacks, technically we are really engaged in three truce talks in Korea.

Number one: we are engaged in truce talks with the communists.

Number two: we are engaged in truce talks with the prisoners of war.

Number three: we are right now engaged in truce talks with the President Syngman Rhee.

In other words, things in Korea since General Douglas MacArthur left, have deteriorated to such a low point that we are now not only facing truce talks with the enemy, the communists, but we are also engaged in truce talks with the people on our side, with the President Syngman Rhee, and with the prisoners of war.

So it seems to me that we would gain immeasurably by stopping this talk, talk, talk. People all over the world are getting sick and tired of. The people of America are getting tired of it. There is nothing to be gained by it.

It was first suggested by Russia. In the first place, when Russia suggests anything, it doesn't mean anything except for advantage to their side, and if they did sign a truce under oath it wouldn't mean a darn thing to me because you can't believe them. They never keep any kind of a truce that they sign. What I want to know is

what could we gain by continuing these talks except lose the respect of the world, as we have in the past eleven months?

So I think we'd gain immeasurably if we cut out this talking and got down to business, pull out our third team that we've got in now, and put in our first team that we had in there once and let's go ahead and settle it.

**Admiral Zacharias:** May I say something on that? We must remember what our objective is in Korea: That is, to have a unified and independent Korea.

Well, now, the Chinese came into this war ostensibly as volunteers, which we know not to be the case. They came into the Korean War as a result of the urging by the Russians, and, of course, the Chinese were totally misled as to what they would be able to accomplish there, and I think that the Chinese probably regret the fact that they have gone into Korea because of the tremendous losses that have resulted to them throughout.

Our objective today is to have a unified and independent Korea. Well, now, I indicated before that time is on our side and for the future, and that we will sometime reach the point where we can speak with firmness. That is the only thing, I grant, that those people will understand. I repeat the statements that I have made of the courses of action that we should take; namely, that the time is coming in the near future when we should say to the Chinese that if they insist on continuing this aggression in Korea, we're going to stop it. But we're not going to use troops against those vast hordes of Chinese in Korea. We're going to use against them, if necessary, to get them out of Korea, all the weapons of mass destruction that

we have in tremendous quantities.

As a result of that statement that I have made around the country, I received a tremendous blast from Moscow, so within the last few days I have attempted to answer that in certain articles which some of you have probably seen in the papers about the country.

That is the only thing that the Chinese and the Russians will understand, and I believe that that is one of the reasons why the Russians have asked for an armistice in Korea. They know what is going to happen and they do not want to become involved in it.

**Congressman O'Konski:** That's fine, Admiral, and I appreciate your position. I've read your books. They're wonderful. I disagree with you on this particular question and I'll tell you why.

Now if you take these truce talks in Korea, the only thing that is stopping an agreement now is how we are going to dispose of the prisoners of war. That's the fly in the ointment in the truce talks at the present time.

Now I'm of the contention that the very people who are now carrying on the truce talks with the communists don't understand how Russia uses prisoners of war. Russia, like the average country that's at war, does not take prisoners of war to give them back someday eventually. Russia takes prisoners of war, first to convert them to communism, so that they can fight on the side of communism; second, she takes them to use them as slave laborers; and third, if they can't fulfill any one of those two positions, either being converted to their side or being slave laborers for them, they are liquidated.

I'm of the firm opinion that Russia does not have the prisoners

of war that she took—American prisoners—to deliver to us. She'll never sign any kind of a truce with us in that regard. If she does, she's lying because she can't deliver the prisoners that she says she will deliver.

We have had experience with Russia in that respect before. Russia has never returned the Finnish prisoners when they were at war with Finland. Russia has not yet returned the German prisoners. Russia has not yet returned the Japanese prisoners except those that were converted to communism. Russia has not returned the Polish prisoners. As a matter of fact Russia has even signed an amnesty for them and they had the Polish officers, the American ambassador, the English ambassador looking for these Polish prisoners all over Russia. Russia said they released them all, and they don't know where they are, and we didn't find out until 1943 that 15,000 of them were shot in the head—15,000 of them, prisoners of war—dumped in a mass grave and buried with trees covered over them.

Russia does not return prisoners of war. Russia will not return prisoners of war in Korea, so why argue with them because we aren't going to get those prisoners back. As a matter of fact, there is already an Intelligence report which has been classified as Top Secret—why it is I don't know—that Russia has killed 3,500 American G.I.'s just as they killed these prisoners at Keiki that we investigated. So I don't see any use in continuing any talks with them because they don't mean it, and if they did sign anything, you know, every time you shake hands with them you've got to count your fingers. Therefore, why continue talking?

**Admiral Zacharias:** I grant what you say about previous past experiences. But I think that the Russians realize that they're dealing today with a different people. They're dealing with the United States and they know what will happen to them if we find that our prisoners have been liquidated in China or in Manchuria.

The last thing the Russians want today is to become involved in a military conflict, and they well know that if they have done away with our prisoners in Manchuria, they know that the American people will become so enraged that we would go to war tomorrow if that turned out to be true. So I cannot go along with the premise that they have destroyed our prisoners over there.

There are some people who doubt that there are 100,000 of our prisoners that we have taken that will not go back, but those people too have been impressed into service. That's the way they get most of the army over there, and that's one of the reasons why, having gotten out of the hands of the communists and the Russians, they have refused to go back, even though we will agree to turn them over.

I don't think that we can do that because we've got to show, as the President said the other day, we're going to have to show that we are a humanitarian nation and we've got to catch up on a lot of things.

That's the reason why we are going to refuse to yield on that point, and I don't believe that that has any bearing at all on the question of why these truce talks are being prolonged. I think it is because the Russians are hoping for a miracle. They are hoping, this being an election year and they know very well that all kinds



of things can happen—they hope that something will occur, if they can keep the talks going, that will be favorable to them.

I do believe that the Russians asked for the armistice originally because they know that we're going to reach the point where we are going to deliver that ultimatum that I indicated a little bit ago, and then what will happen? They will either have to come in themselves, become involved in a military way, or they are going to lose tremendous prestige throughout the world.

The best way to prevent either one of those from happening is to go ahead and have an armistice, and I firmly believe that if we continue the truce talks, we are going to have an armistice and then we can go ahead and try to bring about the political settlements.

**Congressman O'Konski:** In the communists' book, Admiral Zacharias, a truce or an armistice, to a communist, is something to be given only if they can gain temporary advantage from it. Otherwise they don't believe in truces, they don't believe in armistices. The very nature of the principles of Leninism points out here and there—which is what they follow religiously—that the only time the communist should engage in any kind of a truce talk or an armistice is because for the time being they are at a disadvantage and they want to stall off the enemy and go into some kind of a temporary arrangement or agreement with them which they have no intention of keeping, none whatever.

They never do have any intention of keeping any kind of a treaty. They've had treaties of aggression with Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Austria, Czechoslovakia—

all the countries of Central, Baltic, and Balkan Europe, and they have violated every one of them. Russia has never yet kept an agreement. She violated the Yalta, the Potsdam, the Teheran agreements.

What I want to know, Admiral, is this: What good would it be to get any kind of an agreement from them when we know right well from past history they aren't going to keep it anyhow, and if they do make an agreement we know from past history they're making it temporarily because it's to their advantage to do so for the time being.

**Admiral Zacharias:** I agree with everything you have to say about them breaking agreements. They violated the Yalta Agreement even before it was signed, and I know that the Russians would not agree to anything unless it is to their advantage, but you well know that in the doctrines of Leninism it is pointed out that it is sometimes greatly to their advantage to retreat.

I think that's the position in which the Russians find themselves today, because they know that when we reach the point in the buildup of our strength, they are going to have to move one way or the other, and they want to avoid any embarrassment whatever. That's why I feel they have reached the point where they are going to have to make the retreat, and that's why I feel we're going to have an armistice.

**Congressman O'Konski:** Admiral, when I ever sign an agreement—if I ever get in a position where I have to sign an agreement with the communists—I want to be sure that I have, without question of any nature whatever, the upper hand. In Korea today we do not have the upper hand. As a matter

of fact, we are at a tremendous disadvantage.

Why should Russia be interested in signing some kind of a truce right now when she's got us having trouble with the very prisoners of war that we have taken? What tremendous propaganda Russia is making from that!

Why should Russia be in a position to try to stop the conflict or to sign a truce in Korea right now when we are having trouble with the Syngmann Rhee government? They're trying to knife Syngmann Rhee in Korea just like we knifed Chiang Kai-shek in China. We have a wonderful knack of doing that. We can't even keep the friends that we have, when we go in to protect them.

Now why should Russia and communism, under these circumstances, give in to us when the conditions in Korea, our position in Korea, today is at the lowest ebb. It's deteriorated to the lowest ebb it has ever been.

Therefore I am against even continuing any talks with them, because we have nothing to gain except shame.

**Admiral Zacharias:** I have to disagree with you emphatically on that statement about our position deteriorating. As time goes on, our resistance is hardening rather than softening. It is a splendid training ground for us, one that we could not obtain anywhere else, and I want to recall the statement of General Van Fleet that we have there today the finest army that ever existed, and I think that that is true because Van Fleet is not given to making any useless statements.

That I believe is true, and I will agree with him that if the communists want to start another offensive, he says he will welcome

it, because he will be able to clobber the daylighters out of them, and I think that is true. As time goes on, we're going to become stronger.

It's true that they have built up their strength, too, but that is a defensive strength—not an offensive strength. The reason we are holding those lines that we occupy today is because they cannot be reached by the Chinese bombers protected by fighter planes, and that's one reason why we should not go any further forward until we are ready to go all the way.

That time is coming, and I think the Russians will realize that and that is why we're going to reach our objective there, which is an independent and unified Korea.

**Congressman O'Konski:** That's fine, Admiral. You say that our position has increased. Don't forget the facts are that we lost 1400 planes in Korea and the Russians only lost 400. That shows that we have been getting the bad of it, that even as far as fighting is concerned, their fighter power has increased. They have moved up tanks, and the consensus of opinion now is that the Russians have more fire power per man in her front lines than we have. They have a million people that they have all ready to shoot at us. I can't tell how many we have there. In other words, our military position has not bettered itself.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, now, I don't know what those figures really are, but I want to say this. The reason for those losses, if those figures are correct, is because we have been carrying on the fighting over Korean lines whereas they have not appeared with their aircraft down within range of our anti-aircraft fire, and



all these other things, and it will be a different story if they ever attempt to come that way.

That's the reason why I agree with General Van Fleet that he is in a position to clobber the day-lights out of them if they ever really start an offensive. And of course when that happens, there are a lot of other things that we are going to do, too, which the Russians probably realize. We're not going to bomb Chinese cities, but I'm quite sure that we're going to knock out all the communications that are available to them today—the railroads—in spots that they are not able to protect.

I think we're going to throw a blockade around there. There are plenty of means that we have at our disposal, but if we can bring this thing to a settlement in a peaceful way, that is what we want to do, because we want to avoid, if at all possible, the beginning of a Third World War. Personally I don't think the Russians are going to allow the situation to deteriorate where they will have to come into a Third World War.

**Congressman O'Konski:** I like that statement "to prevent a Third World War." The very fact that we have lost 120,000 casualties in Korea alone, that's to me not a police action. To me, that's a Third World War. They have a different way of counting casualties now than we used to have, you know. Now you aren't considered a casualty unless the enemy actually shoots at you. If you get your feet frozen on maneuvers, you aren't counted as a casualty, but you add to the 120,000 casualties that we've had in Korea another 100,000 non-battle casualties which they don't count anywhere in the War Department, and there you have almost a quarter

of a million American casualties. To me, that's a large-scale war.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, in spite of the fact that they have unlimited man power in those areas, it is a fact that the Chinese have lost probably a million and a half, the cream of their army. The North Korean army has been wiped out—600,000 men—so we haven't been doing too badly with that activity and the Chinese know it.

They don't enjoy going out and getting killed, and of course one of the reasons why all this thing materialized—I agree it could have been prevented. We had two opportunities to prevent the very conditions that we have in China today. And of course that's where we missed the boat. We haven't time, though, to go into that, but that is a fact. But we are on the right course today, and we must keep these truce talks going.

I was glad General Ridgway made the admonition that we must be patient, because I have before me here a little poem that was written by Rudyard Kipling and I think everyone will realize that he knew the Far East. He said, "The end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the epitaph sad and drear: A fool lies here that tried to hurry the East."

That is the thing that we must realize, because particularly with Oriental bargaining, you're going to have to go on at extreme lengths.

**Congressman O'Konski:** That's fine, Admiral, that's a very good statement. We've got a lot of tombstones over there because we lost about 300,000 in the war against the Japanese. We had a quarter million casualties in the Korean war—battle and non-battle. That's a lot of tombstones to have

had to be patient with the Far East.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Let me ask you a question now. What would you do? What is your alternative? When you stop the truce talks, what would you do?

**Congressman O'Konski:** Oh, my answer is very simple. I'd cut out the truce talks immediately. I'd send my first team back. I'd send General Douglas MacArthur back there, because he is the only man so far that understands the problem over there and who has had the courage enough to muster his courage to come before the Congress and the American people and tell them what should be done.

**Admiral Zacharias:** No, I wouldn't agree. I wouldn't agree that he is the only man, and I might say this. I don't criticize General MacArthur. I say that his removal was probably ill-advised and badly handled but I do say this: He advocated bombing Manchuria over a year ago. That might have produced difficulties. If there was the slightest possible chance that the Third World War might have been precipitated by such action, it was proper not to do it, because we must exhaust every resource at our disposal in order to prevent World War III from starting.

Even if you'd bomb Manchuria, then what would you have done? Those questions have not been answered yet so that the course of action that you advocate now is still a little bit premature. We are coming to that day, and when the time comes, I believe that knowing that the only language those people, the Russians, understand and the communists understand is strength—when the time comes and we are in a position to

do it, well then, we can go ahead and speak up in forthright terms.

**Congressman O'Konski:** Then here is another thing I'd do, Admiral. After I got General Douglas MacArthur over there, I'd say: "Go ahead. Let Chiang Kai-shek and his forces go. We're sick and tired of having only Americans die for freedom. Let other people who believe in freedom die too."

It is a tragic thing in Korea and the Pacific. It really is tragic. We've got one-half of our Navy in the Pacific helping our G. I.'s in Korea, and we've got the other half of our Navy around Formosa keeping Chiang Kai-shek from going into China and at the same time allowing Polish ships and Czechoslovakian ships come up the Chinese coast with ammunition for the Chinese communists.

Believe it or not, we are in a position right now where we have our Navy helping our G. I.'s in Korea and helping the communists in China. That's one heck of a situation to have.

I'd get the Navy out of there and say to Chiang Kai-shek: "You can use that Navy; go ahead." Listen, we've had in Korea out of 107,000 prisoners 100,000 defections who don't want to go back to China or North Korea. That gives you an idea of the number of people in that army if Chiang Kai-shek landed in China, who would come over to his side. That's a ratio of 10 to 7.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, but let me ask this. What reason have you to believe that those troops now with Chiang Kai-shek would fight any more than they were willing to fight when those many divisions of his that we fully equipped to fight the Japanese and the communists, if necessary, deserted to the communists?

**Congressman O'Konski:** Oh, they had been sold a bill of goods—what a wonderful thing communism was. But now they have tasted it, and they don't want it, and if you read Admiral Cook's article in the *United States News* did you read it?

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, no, but I disagree with Cook on many things. You know, he's been taken under fire by the opponents of the China lobby.

General MacArthur, you know, quite properly refused the use of those troops in Korea in the first place and he was quite right on that, because that would have been the one pretext on which the Chinese could come into the war. But now, what purpose would they serve? Would we then move into Formosa to protect Formosa? I agree with General MacArthur that Formosa in the hands of an unfriendly power is dangerous to our strategic position. And I want to emphasize that the Secretary of State pointed out some time ago that our defense line runs through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines and that is the defense line behind which we can protect ourselves; and, of course, Formosa, in the hands of an unfriendly power, would damage that position.

**Congressman O'Konski:** That's right, Admiral. When we sent our Navy to defend Formosa to keep Chiang Kai-shek in his corner, the Chinese communists took the army that they had over there on the Chinese coast in order to save China from Chiang Kai-shek. They moved them. They said, "Why should we protect the Chinese coast? We've got the United States Navy doing it for us." So they took these soldiers and they sent them to Korea to kill

our boys, and that's exactly what is going on now. Believe it or not, the same situation.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, that's a different story. That doesn't have any bearing on the truce talks. I don't see how Chiang Kai-shek's troops could affect one way or the other the continuance of or the stopping of the truce talks.

**Congressman O'Konski:** Oh, yes, if we let Chiang Kai-shek loose to worry them a little bit so that they'd have to send these soldiers that they're using in Korea against us to defend communism in China, they'd have less people over there. We'd be more in a position where we'd get more of the upper hand.

**Admiral Zacharias:** Well, now, do you believe in our going into a war on the continent of China proper? Because if we turn them loose, we're going to have to carry them over there and land them in China. We're going to have to supply them and then we're going to have to take their place after they've been wiped out or if they have run home, which I think is the principal course of action you'll find, when you land those boys in China once more.

**Congressman O'Konski:** I know that if we let Chiang Kai-shek loose, we won't have to send another division to Korea or to Japan. We can do it with what we have but we can do it better because I'd much rather have a Chinese fighting a Chinese than to have us take them on which we will eventually do, if we don't do this now.

**Admiral Zacharias:** But I do not want to get bogged down in a war in China because that's exactly what the Russians hoped would occur when they started Korea. Of course, we misled the Russians into believing that we'd



do nothing about Korea and it would be a *fait accompli*. But if not, they hoped that we would be so mad about it that we'd get into a war with China; and if we ever do that, that's going to be our finish.

**Dr. Gross:** Congressman, does that stop you absolutely cold?

**Congressman O'Konski:** No, I disagree wholeheartedly with that.

I think the only course of action is open to us. It's a matter of good reasoning. Here we've got 500,000 men wanting to fight for freedom on Formosa. Our Navy...

**Dr. Gross:** I must interrupt for a moment. Now Admiral and Congressman, I think we ought to go out to the audience and get some questions here which will challenge your wits.

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## QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

**Dr. Gross:** The first question is coming from a friend of ours here, Mrs. Geraldine Fitch, who has spent many years in China and in Korea.

**Mrs. Fitch:** Of course, just as soon as the discussion got off onto China, I wanted to change my question; and perhaps it would be apropos to tell you something that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said to me in an exclusive interview just about two months ago, when we were talking about the prisoners of war in Korea. He said, "I have made that offer of 35,000 troops and have repeated it. I do not intend to offer them again or to press for their acceptance. But one thing I can say is that if those Chinese prisoners of war, who have petitioned in blood to be sent to Formosa are returned by force, then our soldiers on free China will not want to fight in Korea. And if they are sent back to their death, we will hold, not the communists, responsible, so much as the UN."

So now that does bring me to my question, because we were living in Korea at the time the Russians and the Americans were negotiating for nearly two years, and the

Korean people saw that during that time the communists would walk out on negotiations, they would obstruct them, they would delay, they would prolong them, but they expected the concessions to be made on the other side. And since I've counted up at least twelve concessions that we've made to the communists in these present cease-fire talks, and are down to the last one now, and you say time is on our hands, Admiral Zacharias, would you have us sit there now until '52 or '53 or '54 and continue to take their insults or shall we do what at least one Presidential candidate has said, start in hot pursuit across the Yalu, give them a time limit on these truce talks, and let them know what they'll get if we don't come to some conclusion?

**Admiral Zacharias:** If it's a matter of accepting their insults why not be more insulting than they are, which is one of the things that we could do if our propaganda was being run suitably. It's one of the things I've advocated because that's one of the things that they can understand. But as for the ultimate action that we should take, I think it's going to be delayed until after November, 1952

because the Russians are hoping for some miracle to happen. They've emphasized that 1952 was going to be a very important year, and I pointed that out in my book *Behind Closed Doors*, which was written in 1948. So that the Russians know very well what is going to happen to them if they allow the situation to go on, and if they do not take advantage of the admonition of Lenin that they must make a retreat—even though it is a very long retreat—in order to come forward some other day. I think that is what is in the cards.

*Congressman O'Konski:* Admiral, you make a statement that Russia is concerned about the election in the United States. Do you mean to tell me that Russia thinks that she could do any better under somebody else than they are now doing under the leadership that we have?

*Admiral Zacharias:* Well, you tempt me to say who the Russians would like to have as President of the United States. Without saying it openly, I suggest you look on page 245 of *Behind Closed Doors* which was written in 1948 and applied to 1952, and you'll find who Stalin's candidate is.

*Dr. Gross:* All right, we have another question. This one I think is for you, Congressman.

*Lady:* As a member of the Youth for Eisenhower Group here in New York, I'm naturally interested in the election, and Congressman O'Konski, I want to know, do you think the question of continuing or discontinuing the truce talks will have to be on the platform of the candidates this fall?

*Congressman O'Konski:* I do not think so because it's a military action, and as much as possible the platform committees of both

parties don't want to tackle military problems and military tactics in the platform convention, so I do not think that either of the platforms will have anything regarding truce talks in Korea.

*Lady:* Even though it is part of our foreign policy? It definitely has to do . . .

*Congressman O'Konski:* That's correct. You won't find them in either platform.

*Admiral Zacharias:* Well, I think that very fact will indicate that we are on the right track of continuing the truce talks.

*Man:* Admiral Zacharias, why is the United States supporting Syngmann Rhee, who has dictatorially arrested South Korean congressmen, jailed a number of other people, and is threatening to dissolve the assembly—that is, the South Korean Congress?

*Admiral Zacharias:* Well, if those people are really communists, I have to go along with him in throwing them into the jug. That's something that we've been delaying too long over here in this country, and it's the forthright action that we've taken here within the last year that has caused the communist party to really go underground and tend to disintegrate. It is something that should have been done a long, long time ago.

I don't know whether that is correct or not. As a matter of fact, I'm one of those who do not have too much confidence in Syngmann Rhee, not particularly because of his age, but because of certain attitudes that he has displayed in the past; and I would like to see a younger and more effective man put in his place. I think one of the reasons for the action taken today is because of the coming elections in Korea, and the present party does not want to be ousted.

*Man:* Exactly, Mr. Rhee expects to be thrown out. He had only 18 supporters who were elected in the elections two years ago, just before the war began. There are 210 people in the Korean Congress. You can easily see what he is.

*Congressman O'Koski:* May I interrupt there to show you what happens when you get us in a position—when the Russians maneuver its enemy into a position, as it did us, into a program of talk, talk, talk? We have talked for eleven months and in that eleven months Russia has infiltrated the National Assembly of Korea, beginning to undermine the government that you have in Korea, aroused trouble in the prisoner of war camps, so that Russia right now has got us fighting on three fronts in Korea. That's what happens when you talk, talk, talk and take no action. That's the most wonderful thing in the world for them.

*Admiral Zacharias:* Well, don't you think that that might be due to the fact that we are not doing the job properly? There are many things that we could and should have done, particularly in the political warfare field, and that's one of the things I want to continue to emphasize. If we would only step up and do the job and somebody take responsibility as it should be done, well then we would have an improvement in all the situations.

*Man:* It's common knowledge that we are doing this thing under the cloak of the United Nations, and yet where are the United Nations that are supporting us in this action? Everybody knows that 95 per cent of the troops and supplies are American, and we're getting so that Uncle Sam has be-

come public enemy No. 1 for most of the world.

*Admiral Zacharias:* That's probably true.

*Man:* Mr. O'Konski, isn't the only alternative to an honorable negotiated peace a long costly war with many, many thousands of American troops killed, wounded and captured?

*Congressman O'Konski:* No, definitely, and without any reservations, my answer to that question is no. Because in the first place the minute the communists find out that we mean business, they're going to backwater, and they're going to run, and they're going to give up their policy in Korea. The only reason why they're going on as they are is because so far they've gotten practically everything they want from us of the negotiations. We've given into everything except prisoners of war, so it seems to me that the reasons why we're on the defensive as we are now is because we haven't taken drastic and definite action. We really have no policy.

Right now if anybody were to ask what is the Pentagon Plan or the State Department Plan or the White House Plan in Korea, I'll buy anybody a new hat in this audience if they can tell me what it is.

*Admiral Zacharias:* You're agreeing with me, then, that we've got to be in a position to do this thing effectively. I go along with that, and the time is not now but will be in the comparatively near future. So those talks must go on for awhile.

*Lady:* Admiral Zacharias, when you returned from the Orient in November 1950, you said at Town Hall that we had given the Reds quite long enough time to



decide what to do, and it was time that we would send a bomb in and quit our talking and our conferences. Why the change in your attitude?

*Admiral Zacharias:* In the first place, I wasn't out in the Far East since 1929. You didn't confuse me with somebody else, did you? Because I have never advocated bombing China at all, because it would defeat our objective as far as the Chinese people are concerned. We have nothing against the Chinese people. Our objectives are, as far as China is concerned, two-fold. Either we want them, the communist government of China, to break away from Moscow, or the Chinese people to rise up and throw the communists out. We could not do that by dropping any bombs inside China and I don't believe that I have ever advocated that.

*Man:* Congressman O'Konski, what do you think would be the psychological effect on the rest of the world if the United Nations withdrew from the peace talks?

*Congressman O'Konski:* I think that we would rise up in the estimation of the world to a position that we once had, a position of admiration and a position of respect. Let me tell you the greatest danger in the world today are the so-called countries that are instilling a psychosis of neutralism. In other words, they are getting in a position of fear where they don't want to take sides for the United States or for the Russians. They want to be neutrals.

Let me tell you that since the peace talks in Korea, since they

have pushed us around and talked us out of everything, almost our shirt and pants and everything else, we have lost the respect of many people over the world and more neutrals have increased all over the world because they say, "Well, my goodness, if they can't knock over North Korea, how can we depend on them to save freedom for us?"

*Admiral Zacharias:* That's because we do not have suitable propaganda, political warfare. If we did that, we would not have those conditions existing today.

*Congressman O'Konski:* I hope someday that they'll put you in charge of propaganda for our country, because I think you've done a wonderful job at it in World War II.

*Man:* Admiral Zacharias, how can the UN break off the truce talks and still maintain its role as peacemaker?

*Admiral Zacharias:* Well, the United Nations is something that we should, I think, spur on to asking Russia what she means by talking about peace when she is giving assistance toward keeping the war in Korea going. We know that the Russians are the culprits, and the time has come when we should really get the United Nations, in order for their own continuance, to make such a statement regarding Russia.

*Dr. Gross:* Sorry, gentlemen, but our time is up. Thank you very much, Congressman O'Konski and Admiral Zacharias, for this stimulating discussion. So plan to be with us next week and every week at the sound of the Crier's Bell.

## BEHIND THE CRIER'S BELL



The other afternoon—a fine one, warmed by the June sun—seemed ideal for an outing. Hence our excursion to lower Manhattan and the New York headquarters of Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) where some pertinent facts were learned about our tie-in with this agency.

Through the years, "America's Town Meeting" has maintained excellent relations with the services, ranging from a tour of six Air Force bases in 1950 to the continued distribution of broadcast tickets in USO centers. One phase of the relation, however, with which many civilians are not familiar is the use made of "Town Meeting" by the AFRS. This was what we explored last week.

Main headquarters for the AFRS is Los Angeles where operations are divided roughly into two parts, shortwave and transcription. Up until several weeks ago, pick-up of "America's Town Meeting" (and like programs) was confined to transcriptions which were air expressed to AFRS stations overseas and around the country. The networks' ten or twelve top discussions were screened regularly for use on a weekly half-hour feature, "Heard at Home." Owing to the time lag from the original date of broadcast until transcriptions could be processed and shipped (at least a month), only topics of perennial interest could be considered. Obviously, this knocked out a lot of lively and newsworthy debates, especially in a year when election fever is mounting.

Now, it is announced, AFRS has also cleared time on its short-wave schedule for the rebroadcast of "Town Meeting" and other programs of its type, in two half-hour slots per week. The series is being called "Topics and Issues" and is beamed to all Armed Forces stations around the world, and domestically to bases and the hospital or "bedside" network.

In selecting material for both "Heard at Home" and "Topics and Issues," the main elements considered are interest of topic, effectiveness of its treatment, and a reasonable rotation of programs. When choices have been made and cleared, the tape recordings are turned over to a producer who times and edits the program according to AFRS requirements. Despite the intricacies of all this, the new "Topics and Issues" series can be readied for shortwaving within twenty-four hours.